Sunday, March 6, 2022

A Flaw in Pascal's Wager

Most reasonable people probably recognize that Pascal's wager is not a very good argument from a purely epistemological point of view. There is, however, also a strange incentive structure to it.

Follow along. If we want to 'minimize the negative outcomes', we should believe in the particular version of God, in which belief undoes the maximal amount of negative outcome. Thus, if you believe in a God that will punish you with an eternity in hell and I want you to turn to belief in a different God, I should present you with a God that will punish both you and anyone you know with an eternity in hell.

But that's not even the end-point. We can imagine a God that will punish you with an eternity in hell, and infinitely improved pain receptors. We know there's multiple ever greater infinities, and we can imagine a God who increases the pain receptors and time in hell into ever greater infinities. Maybe God even can copy your consciousness and punish both? All three of them! An infinity of them!

Thus, the God that Pascal's wager would ultimately lead you to accept is either the maximally cruel God if such a God can be imaginable, or ever crueller Gods replacing each other as fast as preachers can invent ever crueller ones.

Thursday, August 30, 2018

Google is a Draconian Lord

A good while ago, I wrote a couple of posts debunking a list of anti-semitic quote-mines and fabrications. After a while, Google's adSense informed me this post violated some policy, but the violation was unclearly described - essentially amounting to 'either copyright violation or hate-speech', and therefore, adSense would no longer have ads on this blog.

I don't make much money off of adSense, I've probably earned like 20€ in the whole time my two main blogs have been in operation. The earnings will only be available to me once they reach 70€, so ... however, the earnings were roughly 50% from this blog, 50% from the other, so ... this basically doubles the time until I will receive any of that money.

I did ask for a review of this decision, and was given an automatic response. There's no more ways of disputing it.

Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you.

A debunking of an anti-semitic fabrication is hate-speech? Or is it that the quoting of a list is copyright violation, a list that is of unknown provenance, that has been making the rounds over office fax machines, in far-right newspapers, in e-mails and mailing lists, ..? Even if it were copyrighted, I claim fair use! But in all the decades it's been making the rounds, no one has ever made a copyright claim.

Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you.

Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you. 

 Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you. 

Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you. 
Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you.

Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you. 

 Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you. 

Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you.  


Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you.

Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you. 

 Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you. 

Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you.  


Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you.

Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you. 

 Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you. 

Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you.  


Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you.

Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you. 

 Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you. 

Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you.  


Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you.

Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you. 

 Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you. 

Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you.  


Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you.

Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you. 

 Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you. 

Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you.  


Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you.

Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you. 

 Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you. 

Fuck you google. Sincerely, fuck you. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Monday, January 30, 2017

My Suspicions about William Lane Craig

I am happy to notice that William L. Craig is less prevalent now in media than he was just a few years ago.I am convinced that debating him is not beneficial for anyone whose opinions differ from his, nor is it beneficial for almost anyone in the audience.

Several skeptics have pointed out that his debates basically only uses the atheist participant as a foil against which to present something that the believers in the audience will find convincing – it serves to reinforce their beliefs, since they won't question his line of reasoning, and no matter how convincing the atheist, they'll shrug his arguments off.

I think it's more insidious than just that - I think he is aware that his arguments are not convincing, and I think he is also aware that most of his fans in the audience are not educated enough to realize this.

In essence, they experience a convincing argument, and are left baffled as to why the opposition - the atheist - does not understand that these arguments are convincing. They then have to conclude that the atheist either is stupid or disingenuous – he must have some underlying, illogical reason to reject the argument of the apologist: he must hate God.

I really think the primary thing Craig achieves is to seed that kind of suspicion in the minds of his fans - it's a subtle method of turning Christians ever more suspicious and hateful against people who think differently.

Tuesday, January 12, 2016

C.S. Lewis: Has People's Sense of Right and Wrong Changed Noticeably?

Lewis' argument mainly relies on the idea that our sense of morality is universal and that this proves that some kind of God must have existed. However, he responds to an objection regarding apparent changes in morality. He states the objection to his argument as such:
I conclude then, that though the difference between people’s ideas of Decent Behaviour often make you suspect that there is no real natural Law of Behaviour at all, yet the things we are bound to think about these differences really prove just the opposite. But one word before I end. I have met people who exaggerate the differences, because they have not distinguished between differences of morality and differences of belief about facts. For example, one man said to me, ‘Three hundred years ago people in England were putting witches to death. Was that what you call the Rule of Human Nature or Right Conduct?’ But surely the reason we do not execute witches is that we do not believe there are such things. If we did—if we really thought that there were people going about who had sold themselves to the devil and received supernatural powers from him in return and were using these powers to kill their neighbours or drive them mad or bring bad weather—surely we would all agree that if anyone deserved the death penalty, then these filthy quislings did? [1, p. 14]
Although it might seem I quoted way too much, we will find there are reasons for that - I find problems in most parts of this paragraph.

Although I thinkby presenting this objection in the context he did and phrasing it the way he did, Lewis made it seem more silly than it really is, I find myself still sympathizing with the sentiment in the argument even in its apparently naive form. Lewis counter-argument just goes to show how bad he was at thinking about things.

By attracting our attention to one of the most obvious examples - witch-burnings - he makes the case easy for himself (because if they really had existed, they would indeed have been terrible beings) but also makes us forget about all the less obvious examples (which would be greater evidence of moral differences). We have not stopped believing murderers exist, yet many people have stopped considering death penalty for murderers justifiable. Another example is sodomy, which in Britain was punished by death as recently as 1835.

We still believe 'sodomites' exist. Thus there's a problem for Lewis' argument here – to state his explanation analogously, we get
But surely the reason we do not execute gay people is that we do not believe there are such things.
clearly, this is nonsense of the highest order. Picking an obvious yet rather specific example makes it easy for Lewis to shrug this important problem off. No, clearly it should be more like
But surely the reason we do not execute gay people is that we believe it to be wrong to do so, and people in former times had a different sense of right and wrong.
Let us visit another issue, viz. that of differences of morality vs. differences of belief about facts. If the morality of an action relies on the beliefs about facts involved, would not very many quite appalling crimes turn out morally acceptable? Would not even an antisemitic act of murder, carried out in the belief that all Jews are conspiring against all of mankind, be morally sound - just factually mistaken?

Clearly there's a difference in the morality of someone who also is a skeptic, and therefore ensures that his judgments of people is based on reasonably well established facts or not from the morality of someone who just goes gung-ho with whatever pretend-knowledge has been thrown their way.

Lewis understanding of this issue is so weak that I wonder what justification there really is for calling him an 'intellectual giant'. If that is an apt description, he must have been quite the stumbling intellectual giant.

Sunday, January 3, 2016

Sad News

D.M. Murdock / Acharya S has passed away in cancer. Although I criticized her work in minute detail, I never held any grudge against her as a person - indeed, the world would be a more interesting place if she had a full-long life-span ahead of her.

Since illnesses such as cancer can leave the surviving family not only with grief but immense medical bills, you can support her family at giveforward.

Sunday, December 20, 2015

A Very Summary Review: C.S. Lewis: Mere Christianity

Together with a friend, I decided to read through C.S. Lewis' Mere Christianity. To be sure, it is a respected and often referenced piece of apologetic literature. Thus I approached it with high hopes - not that I expected it to convert me to Christianity or even make me slightly more partial to considering Christian doctrines as 'potentially true'.

What I find is a pretty sophomoric level of sophistication. Lewis even stoops as low as virtual ad hominem responses to arguments. A lot of his arguments rely on lack of imagination, essentially 'false dilemmas' or even false trilemmas. Simply put, God can only be a certain way because that's the only way Lewis can imagine him. God must have been this way, because Lewis cannot imagine anything else. Thus Lewis sets his own mind up to be the meta-God by which any God must adhere.

A major conceit is present already in the title - and it's a conceit that later on is glossed over with a sprinkle of ad hominem. To spell out in detail what conceit I am referring to, it is the very notion of 'mere Christianity'. Lewis claims to express the most rudimental, fundamental parts of Christianity - these are the stances you at least need to hold to be a Christian. Yet, in the very first part of the book, he admits to the existence of Christians that do not hold them, and his argument for rejecting them is nothing but name-calling: Christianity and water. Their Christianity is dilute - that's given as an assertion or even an axiom, with no actual argument backing it up.

This bodes ill for the intellectual standards of apologetics from Lewis' day onwards.

Lewis was fond of a form of the argument from morality. However, his lack of logic is quite evident as he rejects the notion that morality could be a form of herd instinct. He argues that morality is somehow clearly external to instinct [1, p. 10]. This he does by illustrating that morality is what triggers instincts and even strengthens some of them, and thus cannot be itself an instinct. I find this a weird argument with flawed premises: he assumes some kind of clear-cut hierarchy of things in the mind that also happens perfectly to correspond to our terminology for these things in the mind. For this to work, the instincts have to be objects of the exact same type, and in the exact same place in some hierarchy in the mind. There's no reason to believe that instincts really are as clear-cut as that, but Lewis probably believed in a created universe that was designed in a very organized manner. Using the un-established fact that the universe is like that to prove that the universe is created is begging the question.

I shall post a series of posts dissecting the fallacies of Lewis' magnum opus in apologetics, a book still considered one of the greatest defenses of Christian faith.

Friday, October 9, 2015

Logical Conjunctions and Probability

I get the feeling when reading writings by theologians on the history of the early Church (and also on Judaism), that a great many of them do not quite understand what happens when you combine probability and logic. Let us consider the following situation:
A B C D E → F
That is, if A, B, C, D and E hold true, then F holds true as well. In maths we can come to near complete certainty that A, B, C ... hold, and thus also conclude that the conclusion holds (with ever so slightly less certainty).

Now, in fields like history and such, it's quite clear that we never have complete certainty – and here there's an interesting consequence of maths.

If P(A) = 0.9, we can be quite certain that A holds ,right? What if the same probability of 0.9 holds for each of the five antecedents there? The probability of A and B both holding true, if they are independent of one another is P(A B) = P(A) * P(B). We can now recursively do this as P((A B)  (C)) = P(A B) * P(C), and keep reiterating, and this obviously ends up giving us P(A ..E)  = P(A)*...*P(E).

The probability of F holding true given P(A)=...=P(E) is no longer as impressive: 0.9⁵ ≃ 0.59. Still greater than 0.5, though.

For a fair share of studies regarding, say, ancient Judaism or early Christianity, it seems a lot of the assumptions that do form part of the reasoning is way under 0.9, though - somewhere in the range of 0.6 to 0.8 would be a fair assessment. Even at the top range of that - 0.8 - we go below 0.5 at our fourth assumption.

Certainly, some of the probabilities might not be independent – some of the assumptions cannot hold without the previous one holding, for instance. But in that case, we still end up with probabilities of the form P(A)*P(B|A) – the likelihood of A and B, given that B's probability is conditioned by A happening, so we're still dealing with multiplication - which generally does produce quickly diminishing numbers when all our values are within the range [0,1].


What further bothers me in this situation is that oftentimes, a lot of assumptions remain unstated, and thus the list of antecedents is left incomplete, giving an impression of greater likelihood for the conclusion than is warranted. Certainly some of the assumptions might clock in at 0.99, but due to how multiplication works, ...

This is a thing that started bothering me while reading Margaret Barker's The Great High Priest – the various arguments in favour of her hypothesis all seem somewhat plausible taken in isolation. However, they are not arguments that support one another - the conclusion relies on at least a very great number of them all being independently correct. So, we end up in a situation where the only argument you can present at the level of the individual pieces of evidence is sure, these seem plausible, if not necessarily established facts. But when you look at the whole structure of it, it seems you end up with something that is fairly unlikely. It is a very clever rhetorical trick, that makes any criticism of it seem vague and unclear.

A good example of this is the following: Barker assumes that the esoteric teachings of the priesthood of the first temple were transmitted to the essenes. Further, Jesus was a member of this order. As a member, he acquired these teachings, and taught them to his disciples. The disciples propagated these teachings all the way to Origen more than 150 years later

It might seem somewhat possible that the Essenes had in fact inherited traditions from the original priesthood of the First Temple; let us arbitrarily overestimate this probability at 0.8 - in reality, you have circumstances where it would seem less likely - wars, widespread illiteracy, . I think everyone would agree that this is a fairly kind estimate. As for Jesus and the Essenes, maybe we'll even grant 0.9. We don't know much about the Essenes - did they teach all their doctrine to all their members - if not, was Jesus among those members that got access to the more restricted teachings? If he had access, did he understand it correctly? Let's be kind again, and put the probability at 0.8. Further, did he get around to teach his pupils these teachings? Did they understand them? I'd say 0.9 would be reasonable kind there.

Did these teachings get reliably passed down to Origen? Let's again go for 0.8. Maybe he had sources that did not learn from people who had learned from Jesus, or maybe his sources had misunderstood what they had learned from Jesus, etc.

At this point, we're way down: 0.46. Keep in mind that I find the probabilities that I have assigned to be rather exaggeratedly kind: I genuinely feel like values somewhere in the range [0.2, 0.7] would be closer to the actual probabilities here, although these are guesses. Of course, some less probable things do contribute to a slight likelihood of her being correct about the main conclusion: maybe Origen's sources didn't get it from Jesus, and Jesus didn't get it from the Essenes who didn't get it from the First Temple clergy, but Origen got it by some other route that did go back to the First Temple? Such alternative ways of salvaging her thesis exist, but seem highly unlikely, and putting a number like "0.01 at best" on these seems to be excessively kind as well.

If we were to look into greater detail with regards to the claims, we'd end up finding that the probability of the presented thesis falls far under 10%.


The same problem with regards to compound probabilities seems to beset a lot of work in the same field – I am compiling examples for a bigger post on this issue.

This kind of "fallacy of implication of the intersection of many independently probable propositions" is a thing I've seldom seen discussed as a fallacy, and I think it's an important one. The best way to avoid it is to either support your propositions with very much in ways of evidence, or to argue for things that can be supported by disjunctions of facts instead - or adds up probabilities, whereas and multiplies them together.

Monday, July 20, 2015

Review: The Indo-European Controversy (Pereltsvaig, Lewis)

A Review: The Indo-European Controversy: Facts and Fallacies in Historical Linguistics (Asya Pereltsvaig, Martin W. Lewis)

A few years ago, a team of researchers lead by Russell Gray and Quentin Atkinson presented a mathematical model for the spread of language families. Applying this model in reverse to the Indo-European languages supported the Anatolian hypothesis, a minority position on the location of the Indo-European urheimat.

For some reason, this was widely published in media, and the paper Mapping the Origins and Expansion of the Indo-European Language Family appeared at the same time in the journal Science. Gray and Atkinson have made very vocal and powerful claims about their findings: 'decisive support [for the Anatolian hypothesis]' is among the various things they have said about their own work.

Pereltsvaig and Lewis go over the results in depth, and find them highly lacking: they find numerous problems in the geographical spread that it presents, including multiple instances where the sanity of the model is excruciatingly questionable. They present the evidence we have against the Anatolian hypothesis (and even more clearly, the evidence we have against the Gray-Atkinson version of the Anatolian hypothesis) and all the difficulties it brings with it, as well as the evidence we have for the Steppe hypothesis.

They also present the evidence that has lead most linguists to accept Steppe Hypothesis instead. 

The argumentation is persuasive and clear, well-nigh undeniable. This leads to an important question: how did Science let a paper that is so rife with unsound historical linguistics pass peer review? It turns out that linguists did peer review it, and Science ignored their judgment, because their negative comments did not pertain to the maths of the model - clearly, having a mathsy model is a guarantee that the mathsy model is correct in Science's view?

Publications such as Business Insider either repost bad science from the Gray-Atkinson team, or add their own even worse spin to it. Consider their version of the Gray-Atkinson animated map. This is, allegedly, how "Language" spread across Europe. In linguistics, "Language" signifies the general phenomenon, the fact that humans can communicate in a complicated system. So if we are to take Business Insider's video title seriously, this is how the ability to speak spread in Europe, and all the current language families were the first languages spoken in their areas. 

Pereltsvaig and Lewis point out a very real problem: other scientists apparently do not take linguistics seriously, and we are facing a rise of armchair philosophers who disdain empiricism in favour of cute models (at least when going outside of their own field - i.e. Gray and Atkinson probably understand how to be scientific in their own field, but when working with language, the computational model seemingly blinds them to empirical facts). 

This, in turn, is coupled with the modern phenomenon of clickbaiting, where the most attention-attracting claim is more likely than other claims to pull in ad money, and thus scientific claims are propagated online not by their likelihood of being accurate, but by how tittilating they are. This is a genuine problem, and needs to be curbed.

Pereltsvaig's and Lewis's book is less combative than this review, although at times it does take vigorous swings at the Gray-Atkinson teams publications. It is a good read, and gives a lot of information about historical linguistics and especially Indo-European historical linguistics. A certain glimpse into issues in the philosophy of science can also be gleaned. It is well written: both clear, enjoyable and relevant, and it does something wonderful: fight pseudoscience.

Monday, July 13, 2015

A Post on my Comment Policy

I deleted a comment, and I will probably be accused of censorship next time I run into the person who posted it, so this post serves only to preclude such accusations. I am not censoring any actual content of it. What I don't want to do, however, is to have my blog host texts that google will index and start posting the first line whenever my name is googled. The line goes like this:
"__________ is just another cyber-stalking lunatic posting his trash all over the place like a troll."
That is not exactly an honest description of me, and I think anyone can understand why I don't want seven of those comments to sit here. I'll give you the full comment here, just so whoever made it doesn't feel censored. I know who it is, and it's a person who's been hating on me since the beginning of this blog. In fact, I every now and then do look for this person online, find they're out doing their proselytizing shtick, and post some comment about just how full of flaws Murdock's books are.

__________ is just another cyber-stalking lunatic posting his trash all over the place like a troll. She already announced a 2nd edition for Christ Conspiracy long ago, which makes your malicious smear campaign of a blog irrelevant, obsolete and a complete waste of time so, grow up and get over it. You need to get a life very, very badly!!! http://www.freethoughtnation.com/forums/viewforum.php?f=26 If you had ANY integrity or character at all you would remove your blog maliciously smearing, defaming and libeling a single female author with stage 4 cancer whose work you obviously know nothing about. You have zero relevant qualifications or credentials as you've admitted elsewhere. Besides, they did a great job at her forum exposing you and your BS tactics so, nothing more needs to be said. _________________'s Smear Campaign http://www.freethoughtnation.com/forums/viewtopic.php?p=26761#p26761 ; )
This comment was posted on several of my posts, even ones that have nothing to do with D.M. Murdock's work. Just shows you what kind of idiots are attracted to her work. I have tried engaging this person with arguments for years now, and it's always been exactly the same litany of how I'm evil, dumb, unqualified and various kinds of insane. I am quite sure this person is the moderator of Murdock's forum, one of the most unhinged persons I've had the bad luck of running into on internet. And in fact, that moderator is one of the few persons I genuinely hate. I have no personal animus towards Murdock herself.

Anyways, comments are permitted, as long as they actually contain any reasonable content. The example given above is borderline forbidden by that rule, since it contains nothing but ad hominem bullshit. However, due to my long-standing conflict with the person who posted it, and the constant misrepresentation that person stoops to, I've decided not to censor this post in its entirety, but just remove my name from it. As comments cannot be edited, this was the only remaining option.

Thursday, July 9, 2015

The Christ Conspiracy: An Index of the Review, pt 2

Chapter 20:
Pt 1 Various shenanigans with regards to trying to show that Christianity is older than the mainstream assessment has it. Here we find Taylor describing the early church in terms that would need some backing up – but as usual, no evidence is given, just assertion. It is also worth noting that Murdock uses motifs from the NT as historical evidence in the most contorted fashion. Polycarp is quote-mined. Some quite vacuous statements about the Essenes are made, including unsourced speculation reported as fact, bad etymologies, as well as directly contradicting the previous chapter regarding the relationship of Essenism and Christianity.
Pt 2 Eusebius' Interpretatio Christiana: did Eusebius claim that the Therapeutan monks were Christian before Christianity? A most precious thing emerges: the quote-mined quote-mine! Does allegorical reading imply gnosticism?
Pt 3 Irrelevant twaddle based on the previous identification of Christianity with the Therapeutans (given that all evidence in favour of such an identification given thus far is mistaken). Murdock thinks 'therapeut' and 'doctor of the law' are etymologically connected. Murdock relies on Epiphanius' knowledge of Hebrew, which is more or less proven to be sub par. (Bad referencing practices, again.) Undue reliance on Higgins.
Pt 4 Murdock cites Geza Vermes, but gets Vermes's claim wrong. A somewhat misleading description of Jewish lending practices. Murdock focuses on the most anti-gentile intertestamental Jewish literature to paint an exaggeratedly hateful picture of Judaism.
Pt 5 Murdock's ignorance of the Talmud is coupled with her insistence on thinking that she knows something about it.

Chapter 23:
Pt 1 Some rather weak reasoning with regards to where western culture originated.
Pt 2 Murdock reports a quote-mine by Jochmans as a prima facie quote, in an attempt to make it seem like the Great Pyramid at some point has been covered by the sea. Some fairly bad arguments (Byblos being an Egyptian colony being presented as evidence for the Bible being an Egyptian book ...) Papyri allegedly five to ten thousand  years of age are alluded to. A claim with no support or evidence presented at all, regarding 'Logia Iesou'. Some quotes that essentially consist of nothing but a nested quote, along the line of Murdock quoting Jackson quoting Kuhn, making looking the original source up tedious and fucking well frustrating.
Pt 3 Misrepresentation of the Aryan Invasion Theory with regards to Indian archaeology and linguistics. Reliance on Hindu religious material for claims of really far back history (on the order of tens of thousand years ago). Not enough sources given to be able to assess the value of the presented claims. Murdock presents an argument that makes her claims regarding prehistory unfalsifiable. Value-judgments regarding rishi-culture and later brahmanic culture that rest on no ground whatsoever. Shitty historical linguistics: Murdock misrepresents the state of Indo-European linguistics as well as downright pulls the wool over our eyes with regards to the Nostratic theory. 
Pt 4 Mentions some Egyptian depiction of a fish trap as evidence of Sumerians being closely related to some North Europeans (but does not tell us anything about this depiction, so we cannot verify this claim). Conflates the Sumerians with Aryan invaders – something not even her source for this madcap claim actually does. Weird ideas about Semitic languages having gone into "permanent eclipse" are quoted. Iranians are mistaken for proto-Greeks and proto-Romans. Really weird arguments presented to show that the Hebrews were Indo-European (or at least a significant portion of them). Murdock mistakes 'levitical' and 'levirate' when reading her source (which got it right) and uses this conflation to present the idea that Levites were Indo-European (for the record, levirate and levitical are highly unrelated terms). Weird and unsourced claims about levirate marriages.
 Pt 5 Unsubstantiated ideas about Abraham's origin are restated. Some pretty bad etymologies presented, of which my favourite is Jessulmer as the origin of the name Jerusalem - which simply cannot hold, since Jessulmer is named for a medieval king. Also, false claims about words in Sanskrit. No references for claims about Jerusalem's origin in Egyptian religion, although pretty fat claims are made. A conspiracy theory regarding the Rosetta stone sneaks in. Some very out there claims about the origins of various British things, such as the word Britain and the druids. Finally, Murdock ascribes some credibility to notions that western culture has its origin on Ireland. A nationalistic creed that probably makes some irish people very happy, but c'mon, not an evidence-based claim in any sense whatsoever.
 Pt 6. Here, full-on delusionality is evident: Pygmies at the root of all culture! A lot of evidence alluded to, none actually given. Bad understanding of the theory of evolution. . 

Chapter 24:
Pt 1 Bad understanding of evolutionary theory. Bad logic.
Pt 2 Shoddy linguistics, shoddy referencing, shoddily unclear claims, chains of sources getting things more wrong during each step, reliance on religiously mislead 19th-century scholars who tried finding the lost tribes of Israel in the Americas, claims about the Chimalpopoca manuscript that are wrong. These fabrications are used to bolster the notion that the Biblical creation myth was present in the Americas. Lots of unsupported assertions.
Pt 3 Shoddy linguistics regarding languages of America and India.
Pt 4 Unreliable sources (James Churchward). Lots of assertions without any evidence. Bad linguistics. Appealing to previous bad linguistics as though it were evidence.
Pt 5 Pyramids. In this part, Murdock quotes UFOlogists and new age kooks. Murdock accepts the Ica stones as genuine. Murdock accepts exaggerated claims about the 'precision' of the Costa Rican stone spheres as accurate without thinking about the methodology of measuring such stones
Pt 6 Giants. Ancient Maps. Saturn having been a 'pole star'. Murdock relies on sources that think writing goes back 150 000 years. Murdock also seems to believe that the original religion of humanity must have been objectively good in some sense ­ - which is a weird idea.

Wednesday, July 8, 2015

Deception and Effort

Honest skepticism has a genuine problem. This problem has to do with the somewhat fleeting character of fairness. How do we grant a claim a fair hearing? Or more specifically, how much of a hearing do we have to grant for the hearing to have been fair?

Basically, the problem boils down to this: for every true claim, for every usefully accurate model, for every insightful understanding, there's hundreds of mistaken claims, models that obfuscate or mislead, and misunderstandings. If we were to grant each proposal the same amount of interest and attention, we would definitely be wasting our time.

This, essentially, is at the root of why 'falsifiability' is so important to science. If we were to nurture a method of looking for truth where non-falsifiable hypotheses were given a lot of attention, we would waste a lot of effort on things that are, to be blunt, very mistaken. Falsifiability permits us to direct our effort where it matters – towards improvement of our understanding of something.

This is why a critical approach to knowledge is the most important tool in the toolkit: it gives us a fighting chance to stave off wastefulness, and to focus on things that are potentially fruitful instead. A big ugly problem rears its head here, though: some people are so attached to their ideas that they will not look at them with a critical eye. Heck, for many of this kind of people, voicing any criticism of an idea is an attack on them as a person. These people simply do not want to play by the rules ­ - they want their ideas to be given a pass, to be excempt from vetting.

This is a kind of deceptive approach - although I don't think they themselves realize just how deceitful this is. They may very well believe they are correct, but by not letting others check whether they in fact are correct, they are trying to rig the process of finding truth, so that their idea will come out on top no matter how accurate it is.

Now, if we granted each idea an equal, thorough hearing, we'd be drowned in frustratingly useless work. We'd end up reading thousands of pages of worthless speculation, just in the hopes of finding even a nugget of vaguely truth-like essence. So, already when one has taken a good first look at the work of an author and found that their work doesn't impress at all due to bad research, bad logic (etc), it is quite justifiable to refuse to go on. At that point, one can be sure there are more fruitful venues elsewhere. There's too much work to be done in the world, to let the ideologically blind lead us down gardenpaths of bad evidence.

However, those who do not want to play by the rules (and who are so enamored with their own ideas) will not concede the point at this point. They'll just keep demanding to be taken seriously. The bulk of this blog, in fact, stands as testimony to the amount of work such bad scholarship leads us to: I've spent several hundred hours reading Murdock's sources, looking for them, cross-referencing stuff, tracing stuff, translating stuff, ... and her fans still think my criticism of her work is just an ad hominem rant.

In essence, the criticism of one particular book that I've presented on this blog is testimony to what superfluous work has to be done if we entertain the notion that pseudoscience has to be permitted a fair hearing. The amount of text I've written amounts to, roughly speaking, the length of a PhD thesis. The time and effort I have invested is considerable. The conclusion that The Christ Conspiracy is worthless is unavoidable and quite well substantiated – its conclusions are less waterproof than a sieve. Yet this work gets us nowhere – Murdock's fans still propagate her claims around the internet, and her claims are nice clickbait. Solid, scholarly work has no impact on the delusional fringe, and wasting effort on debunking it is essentially futile. This does not stop me, since I would get a bad conscience otherwise, but I fear that in these days of clickbait, reason and rationality will lose out to mass-appeal and controversy.

Fallacies II: General Word-related Fallacies

Fallacies: General Word-related Fallacies

as well as Fallacies with Similar Basic Flaws in Reasoning


There are many kinds of fallacies that fly by rather unnoticed, especially in online debates. The previous example is but one, and it is not even of a similar type of word-related fallacy that I am thinking of right now. Having consulted several lists of fallacies, it turns out only some of the semantic fallacies seem to have names - and even then, the scope they are given tends to be fairly restricted, even if the same kind of fallacy easily could be applied elsewhere as well.

Often, these fallacies are of a kind I would call naive prescriptive lexical Platonic realism

Example 1: The Jews are the members of a religion, hence the Jews cannot form an ethnicity too.
This assumes that the definitions of religion and ethnicity are
  • mutually exclusive
  • objectively right and true
  • prescriptive, rather than descriptive
Mutually exclusive signifying that if something signifies a religion, it cannot also signify the members of an ethnicity and vice versa. Objectively right and true in that using even slightly different definitions somehow is objectionable - and some seem to think this objectionableness is objectively true, even - essentially stating that there is an absolute ethics that forbids using terms in a different way. Prescriptive, in that if something is a religion, it must conform - religion is strictly defined, and when we say something is a religion, all this baggage suddenly comes along and we can also therefore predict a lot of things about the subject - in this case, Judaism - once we know it is a religion.

Usually, the thing we can know about a religion - any religion, really, but Judaism will be the example I will use here - is that it is exactly like protestant Christianity. Viz. it has a scripture, which is its only source of doctrine and rules, which are obtained by a literal reading of that book. It has ceremonies and beliefs, and if you do not hold those beliefs, you are going to hell. If you hold the right beliefs, you go to heaven. The rabbi is the person who leads the service, and he serves as some kind of interface between God and the believer. He also has the right to officiate at weddings, and perform circumcisions and so on. 

All of those are basically wrong to different extents:
  • Judaism does have scripture, but they are not the only source of doctrines and rules, and the rules are not obtained by literal readings of the text.
  • The beliefs about the afterlife are not clearly spelled out, but it would seem almost all Jews reject the idea of an eternal hell, as well as the belief that condemnation depends on belief. Going to heaven is definitely not predicated on having the right belief.
  • The rabbi is a scholar of Judaism, not a middleman. He is supposed to know the rules of Judaism well, and to be able to reach conclusions on new issues in Jewish law. It is tradition that each Jewish congregation should have a rabbi as its leader, but he does not have any specific role in the service (although some congregations may have traditions along the lines of 'the rabbi must never turn his back to the congregation during a service', essentially placing him the furthest back!). Any bar-mitzva Jewish man (and in conservative and reform Judaism women as well) who knows the liturgy can lead it. It is not unusual that the rabbi does not take that role. I gather in more liberal versions of Judaism, it is more common for a rabbi to officiate, but even then this is not mandatory.
  • Jewish rabbis do officiate at weddings in some countries where secular law has given them that right (or, from a Jewish religious point of view, forced that responsibility on them by requiring that someone officiate at weddings in the first place). Jewish law does not require that, but instead requires witnesses and the signing of a wedding contract - the ketubah. Oftentimes, of course, the only persons available to check the validity of the ketubah per Jewish law is a rabbi, but if someone else of sufficient knowledge can verify it, that is ok. The verification, as far as I can tell, need not occur during the wedding itself but can be done earlier.
All of these are things I have seen people assume hold true for Judaism simply because Judaism is a religion. Apparently, people believe that the word religion only includes things which satisfy all the things I italicized above (or some other similar list of distinctive features).

Similarly, you run into some atheists who refuse to accept that Buddhism is a religion because it is not theistic, or it lacks this or that trait that protestant Christianity has.

To me, this seems a very naive view of what it means for something to be something. When a chef calls a fruit a berry, he is not disagreeing with the botanist, he is not making a statement along the lines that modern biology is wrong. He is classifying the various plant parts he runs into according to their use in cooking and such characteristics that he readily can discern.

A commonly raised objection to my stance here would be that words mean things, and superficially, it would seem my stance undermines this guarantee. I have two major responses to that criticism.

First, this is in fact typical of human language, and enables it to adapt to any number of new situations. We cannot a priori know which traits are important distinguishing lines, and a purely taxonomic approach will probably be useless - if the chef adhered to biological taxonomy, the fruit compote suddenly turns into a berry, drupe and aggregate fruit compote and the average green salad no longer contains vegetables, but tubers, leafs, false fruits (cucumber), ...
Clearly words have to have useful meanings as well; and for the chef, vegetable is a more useful category than most botanical meanings. I am not saying the botanist is wrong, I am saying his or her classification is useful in one context, not the other.

Further, the classificatory scheme used by the botanists and biologists in general rely on observations that are needlessly complex for most real-world situations. Developing some kind of artificial fertilizer might benefit from such observations - cooking probably does not.

Finally, words still mean things in my approach. In fact, it turns out my approach preserves, with greater fidelity, the meaning of words as they are attested in actual use. If we made a tool intended to efficiently fix a certain problem, and people found another use for it that was better, more useful, and so on, would we be right to refuse to accept the results of their use of it, to scorn them for finding a better application for it? This is what a prescriptive armchair prescriptivist approach essentially does.

Getting back to the main example I have been running with - viz. Jews - members of a religion or members of an ethnicity?- we can easily find a synthesis of these two statements. Judaism is indeed a religion, a religion that concerns itself a lot with a specific ethnicity. Non-members of this ethnicity can believe in the religion without joining the ethnicity, (but this is unusual). Non-members of the ethnicity who wish to join the ethnicity, can do so. In doing so, they become part of the community - and ethnicities tend to form communities. Ethnicity and religion both are somewhat fluid concepts, and both are relatively recent concepts as well. Judaism as a religion predates the current "formal" definition of what a religion is. The Jewish people, as an ethnicity, predates the current "formal" definition of what an ethnicity is.

Both religion and ethnicity are terms that have been made up to describe some phenomena we have experiences of - viz. some humans have cultural, linguistic, etc links that make them form a kind of group. Ethnicity, in addition, is somewhat fuzzy, one can simultaneously belong to several different ethnicities that overlap in various ways, not necessarily even hierarchically. I am simultaneously a member of the Swedish-speaking Finns, the Finns, the major Swedish ethnical sphere (but I am not a member of the Swedish-ethnicity in Sweden), Ostrobothnians, and maybe even some other group. I know Jewish people that are Jewish, Swedish-speaking Finns and Finns, and Jewish people that are Jews and Finns. I also know Jewish people who are Jewish and American. The fact that Jewish people can be members of other ethnicities does not preclude Jewish people from being members of a Jewish ethnicity as well - ethnicities are not necessarily mutually exclusive, except in some specific frameworks ­ - but if we demand that such a framework is adhered to, we are enforcing an interpretation of things, not trying to describe them objectively.

There we run into an important concept: frameworks. Whether a certain thing is an ethnicity or not may very well be different in the eyes of secular law, the opinions of individual members of the different ethnicities, etc. We need to know which framework is being assumed to know whether something is accurate and to know what knowledge we can derive from a statement made in that framework. If someone says Buddhism isn't a religion, we must know what kind of framework this statement is made in to be able to know what it says about Buddhism - on the other hand, the same applies when someone says Buddhism is a religion. Words still mean things, but context tells us what things they mean.

Too often "words mean things" is used to reach a conclusion that does not validly follow from what is known about a thing, and the examples I gave above with regards to conclusions about Judaism based on knowing one single factoid about Judaism should amply illustrate just how flawed this form of reasoning is. Yet it's a fairly popular form of reasoning even among people who pretend to be rationalists, skeptics and scientifically minded.

Tuesday, June 16, 2015

The Christ Conspiracy: An Index to the Review

Since the review of The Christ Conspiracy reached spectacular lengths, a post that indexes the articles seems called for. Short summaries of the problems identified in each instalment follows. This post should be seen as an appendix to the conclusion. Due to the proliferation of posts dealing with chapters 20, 23 and 24, and their close relationship, there are multiple separate entries for these.

The problems encountered in this chapter do not really relate all that closely to the thesis itself, but do showcase that Murdock plays fast and loose with the truth.
A couple of really fudgy claims, based on a sequence of sources misunderstanding and exaggerating each other's claims. Unreliable sources in general. However, the chapter itself does not contribute much to the conclusion of the book. The general claim that is made could be made with credible sources – Murdock has just chosen to use shoddy sources and shoddy claims to prop up a reasonable claim.
Some fallacies along the lines of the etymological fallacy, and a particularly strange logical fallacy – viz. the idea that someone acting illogically is evidence of his non-existence. She also claims that 'pious fraud' was coined to describe Christian practices, when the phrase in fact pre-dates Christianity by several decades.
Protestant slander of a pope taken seriously. Saman and Maga? Sources please.  Pure speculation about the role of gnostics. Speculation about the 'malodorous chrism' as a term for sperm. A fabrication about the contents of the Nag Hammadi library.
A mistaken reference (demonstrating that Murdock has not verified the veracity of the sources of her source). Unreliable numismatic third-hand evidence. Shoddy referencing.
Misunderstands the Documentary Hypothesis. The orthodox dating of Pharaohs is off. A naive understanding of translation is evident. Ignorance of Hebrew phonemes makes for the amusing thought that the tetragrammaton contains the name of Eve. Acharya thinks that the use of the designation "Askhenazi" for eastern European Jews is evidence that early Judaism was greatly influenced by Aryans. Mr. Spock's (!) Vulcan Salute is presented as evidence that the Jewish God is a volcano God. Silly attempts to identify "Israel" as "Isis-Ra-El". Some more bullshit linguistics.
A genuinely sub-par understanding of what allegory is, as well as mischaracterizing the Hebrew grammatical gender as a system of allegory.
Identifies the Book of Jasher referred to in the Bible as the medieval Book of Jasher.
Reads Amos' harangue against the worshippers of the God Kaiwan as though this was admission that Kaiwan is part of Biblical theology. Without any supporting evidence, she equates Kaiwan and El. This is followed what looks suspiciously much like Acharya admitting to believing in astrology - her definition of astrology is very positive and downright naive.

This is followed by use of an unreliable source (Pike). It is claimed that toponomies in the Bible are widely astrological - a claim that rests on such a weak foundation that it's in fact laughable. (From an unreliable source, again). Strong pareidolia (since there's seven stars in the Pleiades, all sevens in Judaism much represent the Pleiades).

Also, the book of Job is a freemasonic ritual manual (as in, that's its origins)
The seven archangels are the seven hathors. Angels are the angles of the zodiac. Murdock thinks metaphor is what you get when you read literally.
Jesus being aware of crosses as an execution method is taken as evidence that he must be invented.  A few severely misleading pieces of reasoning regarding etymologies (hell, pesach), and other bad linguistics. Generally some of the reasoning indicates that Murdock thinks English designations are magical lenses into the past of a number of concepts. Bad dating of the Talmud. Claims which were not supported by their source whatsoever (i.e. Barbara Walker claiming that various things derive from Egyptian prayers to Osiris.)
A treasure trove of bad linguistics.
An instance of the linguistic fallacy of very short words (John - Aan), as well as an unsubstantiated and somewhat suspicious assertion.

A seriously debunked dating of the Dendera temple. Atlantean racial theories pop up - i.e. the fact that the author of Revelations mentions a 'man' as one out of four symbols is seen as evidence that the author of Revelations believed in Theosophist racial theories (i.e. Adam is The Atlantean). There's a distinct lack of argumentation beyond assertions.
Murdock subscribes naively to idealizing descriptions of the Essenes. She rejects the DSS as having anything to do with them, and thus basically ends up having next to no evidence regarding their beliefs. Nevertheless, she dares make several sweeping statements as to what these beliefs were. Her argument in general is unclear.
Chapter 20:
Pt 1 Various shenanigans with regards to trying to show that Christianity is older than the mainstream assessment has it. Here we find Taylor describing the early church in terms that would need some backing up – but as usual, no evidence is given, just assertion. It is also worth noting that Murdock uses motifs from the NT as historical evidence in the most contorted fashion. Polycarp is quote-mined. Some quite vacuous statements about the Essenes are made, including unsourced speculation reported as fact, bad etymologies, as well as directly contradicting the previous chapter regarding the relationship of Essenism and Christianity.
Pt 2 Eusebius' Interpretatio Christiana: did Eusebius claim that the Therapeutan monks were Christian before Christianity? A most precious thing emerges: the quote-mined quote-mine! Does allegorical reading imply gnosticism?
Pt 3 Irrelevant twaddle based on the previous identification of Christianity with the Therapeutans (given that all evidence in favour of such an identification given thus far is mistaken). Murdock thinks 'therapeut' and 'doctor of the law' are etymologically connected. Murdock relies on Epiphanius' knowledge of Hebrew, which is more or less proven to be sub par. (Bad referencing practices, again.) Undue reliance on Higgins.
Pt 4 Murdock cites Geza Vermes, but gets Vermes's claim wrong. A somewhat misleading description of Jewish lending practices. Murdock focuses on the most anti-gentile intertestamental Jewish literature to paint an exaggeratedly hateful picture of Judaism.
Pt 5 Murdock's ignorance of the Talmud is coupled with her insistence on thinking that she knows something about it.

Chapter 23:
Pt 1 Some rather weak reasoning with regards to where western culture originated.
Pt 2 Murdock reports a quote-mine by Jochmans as a prima facie quote, in an attempt to make it seem like the Great Pyramid at some point has been covered by the sea. Some fairly bad arguments (Byblos being an Egyptian colony being presented as evidence for the Bible being an Egyptian book ...) Papyri allegedly five to ten thousand  years of age are alluded to. A claim with no support or evidence presented at all, regarding 'Logia Iesou'. Some quotes that essentially consist of nothing but a nested quote, along the line of Murdock quoting Jackson quoting Kuhn, making looking the original source up tedious and fucking well frustrating.
Pt 3 Misrepresentation of the Aryan Invasion Theory with regards to Indian archaeology and linguistics. Reliance on Hindu religious material for claims of really far back history (on the order of tens of thousand years ago). Not enough sources given to be able to assess the value of the presented claims. Murdock presents an argument that makes her claims regarding prehistory unfalsifiable. Value-judgments regarding rishi-culture and later brahmanic culture that rest on no ground whatsoever. Shitty historical linguistics: Murdock misrepresents the state of Indo-European linguistics as well as downright pulls the wool over our eyes with regards to the Nostratic theory. 
Pt 4 Mentions some Egyptian depiction of a fish trap as evidence of Sumerians being closely related to some North Europeans (but does not tell us anything about this depiction, so we cannot verify this claim). Conflates the Sumerians with Aryan invaders – something not even her source for this madcap claim actually does. Weird ideas about Semitic languages having gone into "permanent eclipse" are quoted. Iranians are mistaken for proto-Greeks and proto-Romans. Really weird arguments presented to show that the Hebrews were Indo-European (or at least a significant portion of them). Murdock mistakes 'levitical' and 'levirate' when reading her source (which got it right) and uses this conflation to present the idea that Levites were Indo-European (for the record, levirate and levitical are highly unrelated terms). Weird and unsourced claims about levirate marriages.
 Pt 5 Unsubstantiated ideas about Abraham's origin are restated. Some pretty bad etymologies presented, of which my favourite is Jessulmer as the origin of the name Jerusalem - which simply cannot hold, since Jessulmer is named for a medieval king. Also, false claims about words in Sanskrit. No references for claims about Jerusalem's origin in Egyptian religion, although pretty fat claims are made. A conspiracy theory regarding the Rosetta stone sneaks in. Some very out there claims about the origins of various British things, such as the word Britain and the druids. Finally, Murdock ascribes some credibility to notions that western culture has its origin on Ireland. A nationalistic creed that probably makes some irish people very happy, but c'mon, not an evidence-based claim in any sense whatsoever.
 Pt 6. Here, full-on delusionality is evident: Pygmies at the root of all culture! A lot of evidence alluded to, none actually given. Bad understanding of the theory of evolution. . 

Chapter 24:
Pt 1 Bad understanding of evolutionary theory. Bad logic.
Pt 2 Shoddy linguistics, shoddy referencing, shoddily unclear claims, chains of sources getting things more wrong during each step, reliance on religiously mislead 19th-century scholars who tried finding the lost tribes of Israel in the Americas, claims about the Chimalpopoca manuscript that are wrong. These fabrications are used to bolster the notion that the Biblical creation myth was present in the Americas. Lots of unsupported assertions.
Pt 3 Shoddy linguistics regarding languages of America and India.
Pt 4 Unreliable sources (James Churchward). Lots of assertions without any evidence. Bad linguistics. Appealing to previous bad linguistics as though it were evidence.
Pt 5 Pyramids. In this part, Murdock quotes UFOlogists and new age kooks. Murdock accepts the Ica stones as genuine. Murdock accepts exaggerated claims about the 'precision' of the Costa Rican stone spheres as accurate without thinking about the methodology of measuring such stones
Pt 6 Giants. Ancient Maps. Saturn having been a 'pole star'. Murdock relies on sources that think writing goes back 150 000 years. Murdock also seems to believe that the original religion of humanity must have been objectively good in some sense ­ - which is a weird idea.
My Conclusion
Pretty much what the title says, my summary and the conclusion I drew from reading The Christ Conspiracy, evaluating its arguments, checking its sources, evaluating the sources, etc.  

Friday, June 12, 2015

On Historical Linguistics: Part 2

The model I presented in the previous post only presents a way of structuring the findings once we have them. The next question then is what changes are the most useful ones to trace?

People like to think that similarities in vocabulary are a reliable indicator - this is probably why the belief that English descends from Latin is quite popular, even to the extent that ignorant teachers tell their pupils this as a fact. The problems with just looking at individual words is that words are borrowed quite freely from one language to another (or, well, at least it seems this is the case in Eurasia - for some reason, South American native langauges seem to have had more free exchange of grammar for whatever reason).

Another type of similarity is typological similarity. Typology is the study of the "properties" of languages, things like "what order do subject, verb and object come in", "does the language predominantly use suffixes, prefixes or neither", "does the language have prepositions or postpositions", and a lot of similar stuff. But here we have a rather interesting problem.

For some reason, various features tend to cluster together: it's not unusual for languages with this or that feature also to have these particular other features - and it seems this follows from some property of our brains or as some consequence of something more subtle about language itself.

Thus, even languages that recently have changed in certain ways, and where we can know contact with a language that already had a certain property is not the cause for the change, we can see that the other features often tend to hobble along in the same direction. Of course, language contact can make this even more powerful – unrelated languages can acquire features by influence, one from another. In fact, large areas of such belts of influence have been identified, and are called 'sprachbunds' or 'convergence areas'. So we find that from the perspective of historical linguistics, the fact that some pair of languages do a lot of things in similar ways (suffixes, SOV, postpositions, ... or whatever other bundle of features you can imagine) does not necessarily tell us anything about whether they are related or not.

However, one type of change is very amenable to a hierarchical analysis - sound changes. Over time, languages have sound changes happening to them. These can sort of be expressed as "search-and-replace". We represent the language in a textual form. (Note: we are of course rather used to this nowadays, given that we have literacy and all, but even a few centuries ago this was not a very common skill. Language is primarily spoken, and representing it as text when dealing with the history of spoken languages does kind of deserve mention of this fact.) We can then, for instance, do a sound change along the lines of this:
t → th
d → t
A word such as tin would come out as thin. Now, in case th did not exist in the language previously, the language has not lost any phonological distinctions - all words that previously were distinct still are distinct. But let's imagine another change:
t → t
d → t
This change removes a distinction, and thus we lose some "knowledge" about how the language was previously - after this, we cannot tell by just looking at a word whether it previously had a t or a d where there now is a t.

There also are conditional changes. These are basically changes that consist of rules where one sound is changed depending on sounds nearby, e.g.
k → t͡ʃ, / _e, _i
This would replace k with t͡ʃ when followed by e or i, a sound change that has happened in many languages worldwide. Essentially, though, such changes can be written like this instead, to remove the need for the notation with / _e, _i:
ke → t͡ʃe
ki → t͡ʃi 
Notice, however, that the k → t͡ʃ, / _e, _i notation is more succinct, and we also are less likely by accident to forget some particular instance. In fact, the change there could possibly be expressed even more powerfully as k → t͡ʃ, / _V, when V is a front vowel.
Other contextual things that may be of relevance are whether a sound is in word-initial or word-final position, whether it's before or after or even in the same syllable as the word stress, whether it's in such a position with regards to some weaker stresses of the same word, etc. To make the notation able to deal with such, symbols for stresses of different types is all it takes. Similar additions coding for whatever feature we need to trace should be easy to add as well. The notation that expresses contexts with / [surrounding sound]_[surrounding sound] is more compact than writing out every single substitution separately, but I am not going for a full Historical Linguistics 101 course here, so I will not regale you with such details.

A good principle:  
i) shared innovations indicate closer relationships
ii) shared retentions do not indicate anything very interesting with regards to distance
Why would this be the case? There are lots of possible changes - a shared change is thus somewhat a priori unlikely. Anytime some part of a language has not been hit by a change we will have a retention, though, so retentions by their nature will occur a lot more often than shared innovations.

Although I previously mentioned that the lexicon is somewhat unreliable, an analogy based on the lexicon might be better. Let us imagine we have a small island on which there are two languages. We do not know whether these first entered the island, and then diverged, or diverged and only then entered the island. We find that there's an animal on the island that does not exist elsewhere. It also turns out that they have very similar words for it, words that do not exist in any of the related languages outside of the island. How likely is it that they both came up with the same word independently? Fairly unlikely.

If they have different words, this does not necessarily tell us anything at all. One - or even both - of the languages might have come up with new words more recently. If they have the same word, we need to account for that: either, one of the languages has borrowed it from the other after arriving on the island separately from the other group (who borrowed from whom does not necessarily tell us who were there first, however!), or they arrived as one language that only more recently has differentiated into two.

However, one thing that would more clearly suggest that they did not arrive together is if one of the languages shared a lot of innovations with some language (or group of languages) outside of the island, and the other didn't - or even better if it shared innovations with another group of languages altogether. The likelihood that all of these groups started diverging from a shared origin at the same time, and some of the groups in isolation from the others had done the same innovations is very low.

A language probably goes through far fewer sound changes than lexical changes - by an order of magnitude, at the very least - through any time span. Sound changes are further not really "loaned" after the fact - they tend to spread through a speaker community - and sometimes beyond it - but there isn't really any way in which they could be loaned. Words are loaned, not processes that happened in the past. A process that is going on can spill over, a process that has already happened is not relevant any longer.

Some changes seem to be fairly common cross-linguistically. We can observe, for instance, that historical *k has become t͡ʃ in certain very similar positions in English and Swedish as spoken in Finland. We know Swedish as spoken in Finland is closer related to Swedish as spoken in Sweden than it is to English, however. The same change has happened in a lot of languages, but Swedish and English are similar enough that one might find the shared change somewhat significant. It's not significant, really – Swedish as spoken in Finland and English don't have any particular affinities. However, such common changes might seem to undermine our use of sound change and shared innovation. There is a solution, however!

The order in which changes have happened may leave traces that make it possible to resolve what the order was. Languages in which a series of early changes have happened in the same order  from some ancestral form (after which more divergent changes have happened) are thus very likely to be more closely related than languages in which no such shared order exists.

An example might be helpful here. Let us imagine a language L and a sound change, lets call it A, where a final syllable having /i/ as its vowel causes the vowel of the previous syllable to become fronted, so e.g. /kaki/ → /keki/. (/a u o/ are 'back vowels' and /i e/ are front vowels; why they're called that can be learned from books on phonology, and I will not get into it. Suffice to say, this has to do with articulatory features of the vowels). Another change I already mentioned has k turn into t͡ʃ before front vowels, let's call it B.

If A  happens before B, /kaki/ will end up as /t͡ʃet͡ʃi/, but if Bhappens before A,we get /ket͡ʃi/. We might find that some related language K has /kaki/ or /keki/ or /keke/ or whatever for a similar meaning, and we can posit with great likelihood that the original form was something like *kaki. However, our hunch would be better supported if we found many words where L's /t͡ʃ/ corresponds to K's /k/. If we were to find that a lot of words in L had t͡ʃ where K had k, and likewise a lot of words have k in both of the languages, we need to account for that - and an ordered pair of sound changes in one of them is a realistic and simple way of doing that. The fewer the sound changes we need to posit to explain it, however, the better we're doing (due to Occam's razor - don't posit a hundred changes when two suffice, etc).

If ten sound changes has happened, there's factorial of ten orders they could have happened in. That's a whopping 362880 different possible orders, each order roughly equally likely. (Well, some changes may depend on a previous change, reducing the number of possible orders a bit, but still.) The likelihood of two languages sharing ten sound changes in the same order without being in close contact is thus pretty low. (A further caveat, however: sometimes, sound changes do not have effects that make it possible to decide which out of two or even three changes happened first).

So, now that we have considered the benefits of the shared sound change as our measure of similarity, we will go on to try and see where this leads us.

Wednesday, May 27, 2015

On Historical Linguistics: Part 1

Historical linguistics is a field that does not produce very "practically" useful results - in a way, I guess it can be compared to G.H. Hardy's characterization of pure maths. However, historically there has been a great interest in it - many of the greatest minds of the late 19th century invested huge amounts of effort in this area. In part this can be attributed to nationalism.

Since historical linguistics deals with long-term history in a way that naturally is associated with the history of ethnicities and tribes, it is natural that methods have been developed to differentiate claims that have been made just to appeal to nationalist sensibilities from accurate claims about linguistic relationship that tell us something confirmably real.

Of course, the fact of two languages being related does not really convey any ethical obligations between the two groups, does not create any reason for speakers of one of the languages to be conflated with speakers of the other, or to assume that speakers of the two languages think in similar fashions and have similar political desires. Nor should it be seen as a way for the other group to claim part in more recent achievements of the other group.

Of course, various idiots have failed to understand this and used as well as abused proper methodology with an axe to grind for whatever retarded reason. Still, the ability to at least somewhat differentiate nationalist propaganda from stuff that is more likely to have some real historical core to it has probably helped rein in some of the most inane pseudolinguistic hypotheses. Such pseudolinguistics still are aired frequently in various venues for nationalistic, religious or possibly even other reasons. I will return to these pseudolinguistic claims later on, so as to tie back to the main topic of this blog.

Of course, another important part in trying to figure out the history of languages was probably general human curiosity - you get a very real puzzle with some very real information about prehistory.

The first observation we'll make is that some languages are similar to each other. These similarities come in many shapes: German and Dutch have similar phonologies, a lot of shared vocabulary, and a large amount of shared grammar.  The same goes for, say, Italian and Spanish. Realizing that such pairings (or even larger tuplets) of languages are somehow related was a starting point, in some sense.

A natural follow-up question is how we rank the relatedness of several closely related languages? Say German, Dutch and English, or Spanish, Romanian and Italian. And by 'how', I don't mean "what is the rank", I mean "how do we go about to rank them".

Let's first define what we mean when we say two languages are "related":
Def. 1: Two languages are related if  they have come about by distinct sets of historical changes that have happened to a shared ancestral language.
Graph 1: an example
The edges in the graph represent changes. We could also use an empty set of changes:
Graph 2
Latin and Italian are related, because both Italian and Latin can be derived from Latin by different sets of changes. Now we can start wondering about things like relative distances.

It is clear that Latin is closer related to Latin than Italian is to Latin. This is a trivial statement, but it can be developed a bit. The model I will present will have a slight flaw, but one that is rather 'acceptable' as far as practical consequences go: we will not be able to distinguish whether Spanish or Italian is closer to Latin. I will later give a closer justification for this particular gap in the system.

Graph 3: A small tree of related languages
Now, we can clearly form a bigger structure like graph 3. Since I have not yet described why we know this structure, we shall just see this as an example of how relations work, rather than as a statement of facts about these languages. With the assumptions given in the graph, we a situation where Spanish, Italian and French form a rather tight group, and German, English and Dutch likewise. We basically can say that languages that share a node, are closer related to each other than they are to languages that do not share that node.

Graph 4: a tree with a complication
We might think that this gives us an opening as for how to compare how close a language is to the root: count the number of intervening nodes. Under that assumption, Latin is closer to Indo-European than Spanish, Italian, French, English, German or Dutch. However, since we really don't know the exact distance of Germanic or Latin to the root, this is putting a lot of stock into the intervening nodes. Also, we could have had a situation like graph 4, where a node we've got no record of ever existing actually makes the distances slightly off (if we just go by the number of nodes). 

Of course, positing an intermediate node if in order to make an assertion regarding distances of some set of languages violates Occam's razor - we can't just willy nilly insert a Pre-Germanic node without evidence, and then assert that Spanish, Italian and French are closer to Indo-European than German, English and Dutch are. What we can do, however, is use this example to show why the number of nodes between our proto-Language and the descendants isn't particularly informative: it only tells us about how well we know the number of languages to have split from a branch and in what order - it does not tell us anything about how great the changes between the nodes are, and thus nothing about which particular branches' nodes are closer to the root.

However, now we do have a hierarchical way of comparing whether (language a, language b) or (language a, language c) are the closer pair of relatives. This is only really meaningful as long as one of the languages is held constant - when we're comparing (language a, language b) with (language c, language d), our measurement gets somewhat less meaningful. 

In the next post, I will present what linguistic content is most often used for finding out things about relations between languages - but also point out how ignoring other content makes the idea of any kind of 'objective measure' of relatedness beyond hierarchies along the lines presented above. (Although one could imagine improvements in method that would fix that problem as well.) 

I will also present some considerations as to why Occam's razor makes the conclusions those methods reach rather likely, and why we can consider families such as Indo-European, Uralic, Turkic, Afro-Asiatic and a number of other families overwhelmingly likely accurately to represent how these groups of languages are internally related.

Sunday, April 19, 2015

An Observation on Antisemitism, Judaism and Blaming the Victim

A certain blame the victim attitude regarding anti-semitism can be found among several participants in various parts of online atheistdom. The idea is that the Jews should not have resisted conversion (into other religions that are just as wrong), and their adamant refusal to convert is evidence of what terrible people they must be - their disregard for assimilation must be evidence of bigotry and ethnic exceptionalism. In essence, by being racist, they have brought calamities on themselves.

This requires quite a flawed assumption: that the Christians would have welcomed the Jews among them on roughly equal terms in case the Jews had converted, and that it's all the Jews own fault.
We will see that very seldom was this the case. In fact, although I point out particular problems Jews historically have run into, similar problems - albeit sometimes in less strictly formalized ways - happen to pretty much every minority. Apparently, ethnologists think assimilation takes at least three generations in most societies. If the society puts up additional hurdles along the way, the first two generations may very well decide to revert their attempt to assimilate. If the society both puts up hurdles and stresses the need for assimilation, the minority is between Schylla and Charybdis, and Christianity very much has put the Jews between a rock and a hard place as far as this goes.

I have decided to present quite a bit of quotes here, instead of summarizing material from my sources; in part because the phrasing often catches, quite well, the attitude and behaviors of the time. The quotes are only examples, and should not be taken as an exhaustive survey of the relevant literature. In fact, these are but representative examples of what historians have found with regards to how medieval Christendom treated its Jewish neighbours.

Simply put, the assumption that Jews were welcome as converts widely does not hold. Sure, a Jew who converted was prized by the church, and often even paraded around and forced to participate in regular evangelization to his former coreligionists (or offered such a profession as a way of proving his sincerity) – and of course, some honest converts probably also wanted to convert their former coreligionists – so yes, the convert was welcomed, but into a rather particular kind of life where he was forced to interact with his former coreligionists on rather bad terms or entirely forbidden from doing so. Some converts obviously saw on which side the bread was buttered, and played this role very well - including making things up about Judaism that would make the Church even more happy. Further, the church viewed the converted Jew as evidence of its own validity and authority. However, even then it carefully kept its eyes on their converted Jews, never quite believing that they were honest about their conversion. The Christian population, by and large, was less accomodating, however.

In fact, widespread doubt existed about the honesty of Jewish converts in the minds of the Christian population in general:
Yet, despite the welcome extended by generations of popes, skepticism concerning the efficacy of conversion of Jews persisted among Christians. No official statement could allay the abiding popular belief that Jewishness inhered so deeply that it could never be effaced by baptism. Why did the pervasive suspicion that baptism by water could not overpower ‘‘baptism by the knife’’ persist, despite formal declarations to the contrary by the church elite? Medieval Jews were often courted for conversion by the clerical elite and well-intentioned missionaries, only to be rejected and distrusted as converts by just about everyone else. [Divided Souls, p. 34-35]
Examples from medieval times are listed in the same book, this being a fairly illustrative one:
One popular broadsheet dubbed the baptismal font Judenbad, the Jewish bath; one who sprang out of it remained the same person as the one who jumped in, now armed with new methods of deceiving Christians.[DS, p 35]
Certainly some Jews converted for the sake of material gains - but certainly many Christians did not adhere to Christianity due to any heart-felt love for God either, but due to the material benefits of being part of mainstream society and the steep cost of rejecting the relative safety of remaining a Christian - thus different demands were applied to converts than to born Christians – converts had to explicitly go an extra mile, whereas born Christians were okay as long as they did not raise a fuss. (Compare what happened to Christians who did raise such a fuss, though, Jan Hus or Martin Luther for instance, when they rejected the authority of the Church!). If Jews had converted in order to fit in and assimilate, they would only have confirmed the suspicions Christians had, viz. that Jews were less than honest about their conversion.
The formal-legalistic, and informal designations for baptized Jews reflected and sustained the belief in the converts' inherent Jewishness. Regardless of whether intended for the benefit or the denigration of converts, such labels served as constant reminders to baptized former Jews, as well as to those around them, of their exceptional status. Victor von Carben complained that even after his baptism people would point at him saying, "See, there goes a baptized Jew"; or concerning his advanced age, "An old Jew seldom becomes a good Christian."[DS, 36]
So, apparently Christians did not tolerate former Jews as "real" Christians - why should Jews then convert, in the hopes of assimilating? Conversely, Jewish law forbids pointing out to a convert that he is a convert - Christianity should have been as magnanimous with its converts as Judaism was! Jewish conversion was more frequent to Islam in the Muslim world, despite (or as a result of?) Jews generally being more tolerated in the Muslim world, and Muslims not assigning any particular significance to the background of a convert.

More examples of this behavior from Christians can be found:
The designations for converted Jews became badges that identified and distinguished them from other Christians and complicated their entry into Christian society. [DS, 36]
Jewish converts to Christianity were often reminded of their Jewish origins for the rest of their lives. Unlike pagans who converted to Christianity en masse in the early Christian centuries, medieval Jews converted to Christianity as individuals. Pagan society experienced Christianization as a gradual collective transformation. Individual Jews who converted to Christianity left one highly defined religious, ethnic, and social structure to enter another faith community whose self-image derived in large measure from a very negative view of the community of origin of the convert. Thus, converts from Judaism could not blend casually into Christian society. Their progress was monitored with all the suspicion and wariness engendered by an enemy who had suddenly switched sides.[DS, p. 38]
With regards to the situation in the Muslim  world, we find quite a different situation:
The lack of any expectation that Jewish converts to Islam serve a special theological purpose stands in greatest contrast to the experience of Jewish converts to Christianity. While converts from Judaism in Christian lands were employed as particularly effective and knowledgeable missionizers, no similar expectation existed for Jewish converts to Islam. In the sixteenth century, the Catholic Church reaffirmed its commitment to train new converts, ‘‘so that from those [who have lately converted] shall come forth workers suitable for the work of the Gospel, who will be able to preach the mysteries of the Christian faith in every land where Jews and other infidels dwell.’’ Conversely, when Christians began to reconquer Spain and large numbers of Muslims converted to Christianity, the ‘‘Christians did not, by and large, experience the Muslims as jurists, theologians, philosophers, and political theorists. They experienced them as a social community, . . . with whom they had to deal.’’ 11 Only the relationship between Judaism and Christianity produced the expectation that converts from Judaism would play a special role. 
Converts from Judaism occupied a preeminent place in the imaginations of both Jews and Christians, and their singular status made the smooth integration of first-generation converts an impossibility. Converts served the Jewish–Christian confrontation not only in discrete practical capacities, but as a trope, a figure of the imagination onto which beliefs and fears concerning Jews were projected.
[DS, pp. 6, 7]
Of course, converts converted for a variety of reasons, and we do have some indications that conversions were not uncommon at all - in which case Jewish racism can't so much be the cause for Jews not converting - however, the reception of these converts may be the reason why a large segment of Judaism did not do so.
While there are no firm overall numbers for any land, the lists and records that do survive suggest that the rate of Jewish conversion to Christianity from the second half of the sixteenth century in Italy was relatively high. [DS, 8], 
Renata Segre suggests that the combined pressures of secular and ecclesiastical authorities, relentless harassment in the form of forced preaching, abduction of children, and other threats tended to induce the most vulnerable individuals to convert. This may explain why most converts in Italy did not rise to positions of power or prestige. Apart from service in the church itself, they did not follow an easy path toward integration into Catholic society. After expending an extraordinary amount of resources to achieve conversions, Italian Catholic society did remarkably little with the converts. Even in cases of noble or wealthy Jewish origins, and prestigious godparents, Italian converts from Judaism could not marry into good society.It is unclear whether this was a cause or an effect of Christian attitudes toward the converts. The suspicion that converts emerged from the lower classes of Jewish society may have influenced Christian attitudes toward them; continuing discrimination even after baptism may have prevented more well-born Jews from being enticed by conversion. [DS, 8-9] The sheer number of conversions in Iberia, along with the naked use of coercion, are unparalleled in scale for any other Jewish community at any other time or place. [DS, 7], ‘‘The number of Jews who converted to Christianity in that time [the eleventh century] is far greater than has generally been accepted by scholars.’’ These include Jews who converted because they were persuaded by Christian missionary activity or because they were attracted to Christian society for the whole gamut of reasons that inspired such crossing of boundaries. Grossman argues that, far from being a peripheral problem, conversion to Christianity was one of the most significant issues to face Jewish communities in pre Crusade Northern Europe.[DS, 14]
So, by making the lowermost classes especially prone to conversion, you also create a popular suspicion of converts being low-class, thus making the higher classes unwilling to convert. Clever, no? What a way of making conversion a desirable career move!
Typically, converts remained within a tightly confined social circle, often marrying other converts. The first female convert from Judaism recorded in Nuremberg married another convert; other converts both in Nuremberg and beyond followed this pattern. Converts to Protestantism tended to marry children of Christian clergymen. Both patterns of spousal choice indicate a poor record of reception as social equals in Christian society.[DS, p. 124]
Jewish conversion to the mainstream religion was in fact more common in the Muslim world - yet in the Muslim world, no particular theological significance was ascribed to the convert's religious background. Integration in the Muslim world therefore went more smoothly. (Also, cultural similarities between Judaism and Islam may have explained this as well - many of the rules of Judaism, such as kosher, benedictions uttered at a variety of times in the day, etc, align closely with similar rules in Islam. However, the Jewish convert to Islam was not forced to denounce his former religion in very explicit terms.)
In 1555, a papal decree (Cumnimis absurdum) presented by Pope Paul IV called for the confinement of the Jews to a particular street or quarter within a town or city. Although Jewish ghettoes had a prior existence in Europe, they had never before received a Pope’s public stamp of approval. Thereafter, Jewish ghettos sprang up throughout Europe. Segregation of the Jews was seen as a means to curb social contact with Christians and to punish Jews for rejecting Christ and for their stubborn resistance to baptism. Efforts to segregate Jews from Christians preceded the institutionalization of ghettos. [RoH, p. 55]
Orthodox Church. A Wallachian code of 1652 threatened excommunication to Romanian Christians who failed to abide by strict segregation vis-` a-vis the Jews, and the church admonished its faithful that sexual contact with Jews would call down the wrath of God. [RoH, p. 66]
Assimilation through professional relations was also not possible:
Andres Berndldez, a parish priest of Los Palacios near Sevilla, de-
nounced Jews for being merchants, tailors, shoemakers, smiths, jewelers,
weavers, and tanners as well as tax-gatherers and officials. None tilled
the soil as a farmer (this was not strictly true) or became a mason or
carpenter, the implication being that Jews preferred occupations that
made money but preferred not to dirty their hands with hard work. The
fact that the Jews in the ghettos were cut off from the soil and other
trades because guilds would not accept them seemed to escape the
priest's notice.[DL, p. 91 
This was even prolonged for generations in Iberia:
 Guilds had regulations concerning access to their trades: for example, technical expertise and social acceptability. The carpenters, for example, wanted their members to be married or at best have a house of their own. This was no doubt partly due to the fact that the guilds felt responsible for their members and helped them through hard times such as sickness or accident. But money that could have been better spent, some members complained, was wasted on festive events celebrating the patron saint of the trade and other fiestas, instead of on charity and pensions. Many guilds ostracized minorities such as Jews and Muslims and insisted on purity of blood.[DL, p. 145]
LIMPIEZA DE SANGRE, OR PURITY OF BLOOD
Old Christians (those people whose families had always been Christian and hence supposedly of pure blood with no taint of Jewish or Muslim ancestry) enacted laws to restrict opportunities for minorities, especially Conversos and Moriscos (Jews and Muslims converted to Christianity, also called New Christians). ... 
The Catholic Kings issued decrees in 1501 forbidding the offspring of those condemned by the Inquisition, which were mostly Conversos, to hold any important posts or to become physicians, surgeons, or notaries. Later came the practice of exhibiting in cathedrals and churches placards bearing the names of those punished in order to distinguish their descendants of impure blood. The Inquisition maintained records of family bloodlines, and before a person could marry or seek office, registers were checked back as far as possible to see if any Jewish or Moorish names appeared in the family tree.
[DL, p. 35 (my bolding)]
The same book details how Christian Spaniards persecuted Jews who had converted to Christianity, even murdering some among them:

While a statue of the Virgin Mary was being carried through the streets of a predominantly Converso neighborhood in Cordoba, a young girl, probably accidentally, dropped some liquid that may have been water from her balcony onto the statue. It was immediately taken as a grave insult by those below, who went on a rampage looting, wrecking, and burning Converso houses and murdering the occupants. Many Conversos fled the city for safer country towns, whereas others left the country by ship for foreign lands. Tension ran high and rumors were rife. [DL, p. 96]
A Jew who had not converted to Christianity was not under the jurisdiction of the Inquisition (unless he could be found to have enticed Christians to Judaism ). However, if you converted with your family, you put your wife and your children under their jurisdiction as well. This opened up scenarios like this:
Age was not a factor. According to inquisitional records, girls and boys as young as eleven and twelve were sentenced to life in prison for observing Jewish rites.[DL, p. 102]
As Jeremy Cohen observes, the jurisdiction of the inquisitions could even be extended to an entire community by converts:
Second, both Christian converts to Judaism and Jewish converts to Christianity who "relapsed" into their former religion came under the jurisdiction of the Inquisition, as did by extension those Jews who consorted with the converts and relapsi in their practice of Judaism. As I shall demonstrate in a subsequent chapter, such an extension of inquisitorial jurisdiction to any who aided heretics could easily be exploited by friars to harass entire Jewish communities. [FJ, p. 48]
So, if you had taught your child to observe some rites, and they happened to observe those rites and were observed to do so by, say, a Christian servant - too bad, off to prison with them. Given that even slight suspicion of Judaizing could lead to torture, conversion was not a good plan even if you by happenstance had come to believe in the Christian doctrine.

Slender was the proof needed by the Inquisition to convict a Converso of being a Crypto-Jew. Avoidance of pork (in keeping with Jewish dietary laws), observance of the Sabbath on Saturday, killing of fowl according to Jewish rituals, keeping of fasts on Jewish fast days, eating meat during Lent—all such lapses were eagerly reported to the tribunals by Old Christians who kept careful watch on their neighbors.[DL, p. 101]
Of course not all converts were thus punished, but bad news spreads faster than good news, and Jews of the time were not fully isolated from other communities – rumours would spread around the Jewish world, and people considering converting would see what bad things befell 
Meanwhile, the church had significant movements teaching hatred for the Jews, which of course strengthened the disdain mentioned previously:
As inquisitors, missionaries, disputants, polemicists, scholars, and itinerants preachers, mendicants engaged in a concerted effort to undermine the religious freedom and physical security of the medieval Jewish community. It was they who developed and manned the papal Inquisition, who intervened in the Maimonidean controversy, who directed the burnings of the Talmud, who compelled the Jews to listen and respond to their inflammatory sermons, and who actively promoted anti-Jewish hatred among the laity of Western Christendom. [FJ, 13]
In more detail, Cohen says:
Prior to the thirteenth century, Catholic theology had demanded that the Jew be tolerated in Christendom. Augustine of Hippo (354-430), whose teachings provided the foundation for medieval Christian thought in the West, instructed that God had ordained the survival of the Jews, in order that their presence and continued observance of Mosaic Law might aid the Church in its mission to the Gentiles, and so they might convert at the end of days. By the early fourteenth century, however, friars openly advocated that Latin Christendom rid itself of its Jewish population, whether through missionizing, forced expulsions, or physical harassment that would induce conversion or flight.[FJ, 14]
The church in fact saw it as its mandate to ensure Jews were treated somewhat badly, as the Agustinian position explicitly stated:
The dispersion and degradation of the Jews, if insured by the regnant Church, would both alleviate the problem of the Jewish encroachments upon Christianity and enhance the value of their survival– by emphasizing the deplorable wretchedness of their error. [...] Augustine saw a definite need and place for the Jews within Christian society. God had preserved them to play a specific role, and they consequently could not be killed or otherwise purged from Christendom. To be sure, the rights of the Jews in the society were carefully delimited and restricted: the Church endeavored to prohibit fraternization between Christians and Jews; Christians could not legally own Christian slaves, nor were they supposed to hold positions of authority over Christians in any way whatsoever. [FJ, p. 20-21. My bolding] 

In conclusion, much like any population, Christians have historically been very suspicious of the demographic changes; both Muslim and Jewish populations that have changed to Christianity have been met with doubt, relegation to second-class status, undue scrutiny and suspicion. Especially under the inquisitions, punishment was meted out even for the slightest hint at having returned to one's previous faith. Racism and "faithism" among the previous members of the religion made conversion a gambit that often only brought any benefits several generations down the line.

Since both communities favoured avoiding contact with the other side, a convert further had to cut a significant part of his social ties – the addition of the risk of being accused of relapsing and thus putting the whole community at risk was of course a further concern. In addition, skills he had learned in his life as a Jew might not be permissible to him any longer (kosher slaughter, scribal duties, joint business ventures with Jewish friends), and the suspicion with which he was eyed in his new life often prevented him from advancing into comparable status in his new community. Since Jews also were not permitted to own land in most of medieval Europe, it was not just a question of converting and just remaining on the farm - the farm seldom existed.

Given these facts, there's no need to posit that Jewish reticence was particularly a result of Jewish racism against others.


Bibliography:
[DL] James Anderson, Daily Life During the Spanish Inquisition, 2002
[DS] Carlebach, Elisheva., Divided Souls Converts from Judaism to Christianity in Germany 1500-1570, 2001
[FJ] Cohen, Jeremy, The Friars and the Jews, the evolution of medieval anti-judaism, 1983
[RoH] Brustein, William I., Roots of Hate - Anti-Semitism in Europe before the Holocaust, 2003